[SECURITY-L] CAIS-Alerta: Vulnerabilidade de DoS em dispositivos wireless IEEE 802.11
CSIRT - UNICAMP
security em unicamp.br
Seg Maio 17 16:28:42 -03 2004
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From: Centro de Atendimento a Incidentes de Seguranca <cais em cais.rnp.br>
Subject: CAIS-Alerta: Vulnerabilidade de DoS em dispositivos wireless IEEE
802.11
To: rnp-alerta em cais.rnp.br, rnp-seg em cais.rnp.br
Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 15:57:04 -0300 (BRST)
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Prezados,
O CAIS esta' repassando o alerta do AusCERT, "AA-2004.02 - Denial of
Service Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices", que trata de uma
vulnerabilidade que afeta implementacoes em hardware do protocolo wireless
IEEE 802.11, propiciando uma condicao de Negacao de Servico (DoS) nos
dispositivos atacados. Esta vulnerabilidade permite um ataque trivial,
porem efetivo, contra a disponibilidade de servico de um equipamento WLAN
(Wireless Local Area Network).
Equipamentos wireless dentro da area de abrangencia do dispositivo
atacante serao afetados. O alcance de um ataque bem sucedido cresce
significativamente com o aumento do poder de transmissao do equipamento
atacante.
Sistemas afetados:
Dispositivos de hardware wireless que implementem o padrao IEEE 802.11
usando a camada fisica DSSS. Inclui os padroes:
. IEEE 802.11
. IEEE 802.11b
. IEEE 802.11g de baixa velocidade (abaixo de 20Mbps)
Sistemas *nao* afetados:
. IEEE 802.11a
. IEEE 802.11g de alta velocidade (acima 20Mbps)
Correcoes disponiveis:
No momento nao ha' solucao disponivel, seja na forma de software ou de
atualizacao de firmware. Esta e' uma vulnerabilidade inerente aa propria
implementacao de IEEE 802.11 DSSS.
Mais informacoes:
. AusCERT Security Bulletim AA-2004.02
Denial of Service Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=4091
O CAIS recomenda que os administradores mantenham seus sistemas e
aplicativos sempre atualizados, de acordo com as ultimas versoes e
correcoes disponibilizadas pelos fabricantes.
Atenciosamente,
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AA-2004.02 AUSCERT Advisory
Denial of Service Vulnerability in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Devices
13 May 2004
Last Revised: --
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1. Description
A vulnerability exists in hardware implementations of the IEEE
802.11 wireless protocol[1] that allows for a trivial but
effective
attack against the availability of wireless local area network
(WLAN) devices.
An attacker using a low-powered, portable device such as an
electronic PDA and a commonly available wireless networking card
may cause significant disruption to all WLAN traffic within range,
in a manner that makes identification and localisation of the
attacker difficult.
The vulnerability is related to the medium access control (MAC)
function of the IEEE 802.11 protocol. WLAN devices perform
Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), which
minimises the likelihood of two devices transmitting
simultaneously. Fundamental to the functioning of CSMA/CA is the
Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) procedure, used in all
standards-compliant hardware and performed by a Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) physical (PHY) layer.
An attack against this vulnerability exploits the CCA function at
the physical layer and causes all WLAN nodes within range, both
clients and access points (AP), to defer transmission of data for
the duration of the attack. When under attack, the device behaves
as if the channel is always busy, preventing the transmission of
any data over the wireless network.
Previously, attacks against the availability of IEEE 802.11
networks have required specialised hardware and relied on the
ability to saturate the wireless frequency with high-power
radiation, an avenue not open to discreet attack. This
vulnerability makes a successful, low cost attack against a
wireless network feasible for a semi-skilled attacker.
Although the use of WLAN technology in the areas of critical
infrastructure and systems is still relatively nascent, uptake of
wireless applications is demonstrating exponential growth. The
potential impact of any effective attack, therefore, can only
increase over time.
2. Platform
Wireless hardware devices that implement IEEE 802.11 using a DSSS
physical layer. Includes IEEE 802.11, 802.11b and low-speed (below
20Mbps) 802.11g wireless devices. Excludes IEEE 802.11a and
high-speed (above 20Mbps) 802.11g wireless devices.
3. Impact
Devices within range of the attacking device will be affected. If
an AP is within range, all devices associated with that AP are
denied service; if an AP is not within range, only those devices
within range of the attacking device are denied service.
Minimum threat characteristics:
o An attack can be mounted using commodity hardware and
drivers - no dedicated or high-power wireless hardware is
required
o An attack consumes limited resources on attacking
device,
so is inexpensive to mount
o Vulnerability will not be mitigated by emerging MAC
layer
security enhancements ie IEEE 802.11 TGi
o Independent vendors have confirmed that there is
currently no defence against this type of attack for DSSS
based WLANs
The range of a successful attack can be greatly improved by an
increase in the transmission power of the attacking device, and
the use of high-gain antennae.
3. Workarounds/Mitigation
At this time a comprehensive solution, in the form of software or
firmware upgrade, is not available for retrofit to existing
devices. Fundamentally, the issue is inherent in the protocol
implementation of IEEE 802.11 DSSS.
IEEE 802.11 device transmissions are of low energy and short
range,
so the range of this attack is limited by the signal strength of
the attacking device, which is typically low. Well shielded WLANs
such as those for internal infrastructures should be relatively
immune, however individual devices within range of the attacker
may still be affected. Public access points will remain
particularly vulnerable.
The model of a shared communications channel is a fundamental
factor in the effectiveness of an attack on this vulnerability.
For this reason, it is likely that devices based on the newer IEEE
802.11a standard will not be affected by this attack where the
physical layer uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
(OFDM).
It is recognised that the 2.4G Hz band suffers from radio
interference problems, and it is expected that operators of the
technology will already have in place measures to shield their
networks as well as a reduced reliance on this technology for
critical applications.
The effect of the DoS on WLANs is not persistent - once the
jamming
transmission terminates, network recovery is essentially
immediate.
The results of a successful DoS attack will not be directly
discernable to an attacker, so an attack of this type may be
generally less attractive to mount.
At this time, AusCERT continues to recommend that the application
of wireless technology should be precluded from use in safety,
critical infrastructure and/or other environments where
availability is a primary requirement. Operators of wireless LANs
should be aware of the increased potential for undesirable
activity
directed at their networks.
REFERENCES:
[1] IEEE-SA Standards Board, "IEEE Std IEEE 802.11-1999 Information
Technology - Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between
Systems-Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - Specific Requirements
- Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) And Physical Layer
(PHY) Specifications," IEEE 1999.
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf
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AusCERT would like to thank the Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
Information Security Research Centre (ISRC) for the information contained
in this advisory. AusCERT would like to thank all vendors that
participated
in this process and provided recommendations for mitigation and/or
confirmed details of the vulnerability.
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AusCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained
in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the
information
described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The decision
to
follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin
is
the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered
in
accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT
takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or
acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin.
If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked
in
any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National
IT
Incident Reporting Form at:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192
AusCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au.
Internet Email: auscert em auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business
hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours
for member emergencies only.
Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
AUSTRALIA
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Revision History
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